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In Classical Greece, conversation was considered the supreme form of  
human expression, in that it was the most human way that a person uses 
his/her body. Learning to speak properly—as H.I. Marrou asserts— 
meant thinking and living properly. Eloquence was what differentiated 
civilized human beings from barbarians.1 It is from these beginnings 
that the importance and meaning of the Humanities were understood in 
the most generic sense of the word.  
The aim of this paper is to reexamine the Humanities insofar as 
they have a genuine educational dimension. The first part contemplates 
the Humanities from a classical perspective and its situation in 
present day knowledge-based society. The second part examines what 
happened to the Humanities in the nineteenth-century Western world, 
and compares that to what happened later. In the third part, some lines of 
argument are presented, which show how vital the Humanities are to 
education. This paper concludes that the Humanities are necessary to 
modern-day goals, both in the educational and social contexts.  
 
 
 
1 
 
__________    ________ 
Cf. H.I. Marrou, Historia de la educación en la antigüedad (Buenos Aires: Editorial  
Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1965), 24.  
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The Humanities in Modern Knowledge-Based Society  
 
Humanism is frequently thought of as a cultural movement which 
looks back at the  Greco-Roman world and extracts from it the ideal 
of complete and harmonious education. This movement which is 
historic,  linguistic,  literary,  ethical,  and profoundly  pedagogical is 
based on the educational value of knowledge based mainly on the 
study of literature and the other liberal arts.  A large part of the 
present day study of the Humanities is a continuation of a long 
cultural  tradition  that  regards  the  Greco-Christian synthesis as one 
in which every true and fruitful humanism consists.2  
To promote the Humanities means stating the supremacy of 
the spirit, and  extracting the consequences that derive  from  asserting  
that supremacy. Murdoch argues against the idea of 
 
. . . two cultures of which science, so interesting and so 
dangerous, is now an important part.  
       There is only one culture . . . the most essential and 
fundamental aspect of [which] is the study of literature, 
inasmuch as this is an education about the way of imagining 
and understanding human situations. We are people and we 
are moral agents before being scientists. . . . This is the reason 
why it is and always will be more important to know about 
Shakespeare than to know about any scientist; and if there is a 
Shakespeare of science, his name is Aristotle.3 
 
W. Jaeger remarks in the Prologue of Paideia:  
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
Cf. A. Fontan. Estudio preliminar a Humanism and Theology de W. Jaeger (Milwaukee:  
Markette University Press, 1943).  
3 I. Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), 34.  
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It is obvious that reading classical literature is not the straight 
road to finding solutions to educational or current social 
problems, but it can be a starting point from which one can 
consider these problems. It can be an opportunity to avoid well-
trodden dead-ends, by using creativity and imagination together 
with reflection. The classics are a good beginning as well for 
avoiding the tendency to place an exaggerated distance between 
science and ordinary life, between metaphysics and morality, 
between theory and practice. The reward offered by the classics 
is learning more flexible and modern ways of seeing reality than 
some modern alternatives can teach, although it is important not 
to see classic and modern as opposed to each other.4 
 
Today, there is a clear loss for the Humanities in education. 
Communication between different areas of knowledge, or to use a 
familiar  term,  interdisciplinarity, is regarded as utopia.5  In such a 
setting,  an  attempt  must  be  made to work out a new synthesis,  with 
the wisdom of the humanities at the base.6 A society which does not 
appreciate the Humanities is a society which has lost its way because 
they give light, purpose, and unity to human life.7 
The knowledge-based society requires, more than anything 
else, educated people in the complete sense of the term.  The most 
far-sighted people of our age, preoccupied as they are by economic 
compartmentalization, social conflict, and ethical deterioration, are  
 
 
 
       4 
 
 
 
5 
        6
 
  
 
Cf. W.W Jaeger, Paideia. The Ideals of Greek Culture (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1965).  
Cf. S.G. Salkever, Finding the Mean (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990).  
Cf. Ibid. 
7  "In a society oriented towards innovation and  communication,  the liberal arts 
take the central stage.  The bonds of this society have a high level of  symbolism  
and require rapid changes of perspective, which involve the use of the creative 
imagination. All these are themes which implicitly or explicitly concern the artes ad 
humanitatem, which for centuries, have been exploring the mysteries of thought and 
language, and lightning flashes have been seen in which these mysteries have been 
expressed through art rather than history" (Llano, 13).  
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seeking to recover the unity which has been lost, and are turning their 
eyes to the Humanities. It would not merely be a question of reading 
Cervantes, Cicero, or Shakespeare again—though that would be a 
great idea.  
As  A.  Llano  asserts,  "what  we have to do is to overcome  
the dispersion of activities and forms of knowledge and recognize 
ourselves again as beings open to transcendence.”8 
There is a need to do something more than admire art, history,  
or  literature.  There  is a  need to  point out a  vision of  academic  
learning which cannot be divorced from moral apprenticeship or the 
imagination without impoverishing all fields of human endeavor. In 
one sense, the past is not yet done away with, and a critical assimilation 
of it is a central task of education.9  
A. Llano adds that the Humanities are precisely those  
disciplines  which  give  an  account of the  human  condition  and  of  
its modifications through time. It is the kind of knowledge which is 
concerned with what is most deeply human: thought, language, artistic 
creativity, freedom, memories and plans, virtues, concern for others, 
ambitions and fears.10  
 
 
 
The 19th-Century Debate on the Humanities within the  
Framework of Secondary Education  
 
The philosophies common to the 17th and the 18th centuries, the 
industrial and commercial expansion of the 19th century and the need  
to  provide  labor  for  the  new  economic  structure created a state of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
8
 
 
 
 
 
A. Llano. "Hacia una nueva síntesis de los saberes. El valor actual de las  
humanidades," Aceprensa, 178/88 (1994): 2.  
9   Cf. A. Llano, Ética y política en la sociedad democrática, (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1981), 
and C. Naval, o.c., 1995.  
10 Cf. A. Llano, "Hacia una nueva síntesis de los saberes. El valor actual de las 
humanidades," Aceprensa, 178/88 (1994): 1.  
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mind that was difficult to eradicate. It basically consisted in believing 
that education was a modernizing factor which was demonstrated by 
economic and scientific progress. Criticism of this model has changed 
with the passing of time, but its main arguments have been retained. 
 At the same time, a solid defense of the value of the Humanities 
had also begun.  
The debate is best observed in 19th century secondary 
education. A deep confrontation between two views on education set 
the scene for consideration of one particular question, that which 
pleaded for or against the Humanities.  
The 19th century consolidated and expanded primary 
education where there was little dissent—on objectives and content. 
The objectives, based on psychology, were established in accordance 
with the natural development of the human faculties. The aim of 
education was to stimulate and strengthen the senses, attention, and 
reasoning in a gradual, systematic process. The contents, even the 
instruments, had to fit into this natural order, with the intention of 
reaching a favorable degree of morality. Basic primary education thus 
acquired a general, common, and informative character.  
The  problem  was  naturally  transferred  to  the  next  stage,  
the  upper  primary  and  secondary  education.  The  entire  weight of  
the  problematic  reform  and  the  deep  disagreements  between  the  
two educational attitudes fell on the traditional territory of classical 
education.  Loosely  tied  to  the  prevailing  mentality,  the  manner  
in which classical education was set up was considered useless and 
anachronistic.  Indeed, until the middle of the 19th century, the study 
of the arts or of literature had scarcely been able to recover from its 
long decline. Although verbalism and technical terms had gone, cultural 
education showed a firm tendency towards aesthetics but without true 
educational value. It is not surprising that a society in the midst of social, 
political, and economic transformation would consider this model a 
luxury  suitable  only  for  those  who  had  the  means  to  cultivate  good  
taste or sensitivity. Educational reform, already undertaken by the national 
systems,  maintained  this  cultural  attitude  without  hiding  its  interest  in   
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the alternative—specialized teaching—that is, a secondary education 
specialized in the principal branches of labor activity. The realist 
institutions, as they were generically called, multiplied. In Germany 
during this period, for example, there were more than twenty kinds of 
Realschulen.  
There was indeed a deep divide between the classicists and 
those in favor of a utilitarian, specialized, practical, and professional 
education. This second option gained ground and invaded even the 
field of higher studies. The danger presented by the end-of-century 
positivist spirit caused an intellectual reaction that brought about new 
cultural values related to the most profound needs of man and the 
contemporary world.  
The debate was part of the confusion of society at the end of 
the century. The expectations of enlightened rationalism had changed 
into utopian ones. The generalization of education, along with other 
factors, had reduced illiteracy and given rise to an incipient mass 
culture. However, these advances could not hide serious developing 
problems. The general diagnosis pointed to an increasing imbalance 
between material and moral progress, between the advancement of the 
natural sciences and the stagnation of the sciences of the spirit. Of the 
two great ideas produced by Western civilization—the person and the 
technique—only the latter had managed to become the universal and 
unifying power, while the former was diluted into a crisis created by 
relativism and nihilism.11  
After a period of confidence in the natural evolution of 
humanity, the collective conscience of the new times showed a great 
insecurity. As in every critical period, there was an attempt to resolve 
the  problem  through  education.  A  moral  regeneration  of  society  
was envisioned, which would respect the complexity and plurality of 
the modern world. This impetus was not to be found in science or 
technology,  but in the educational potential of  the  Humanities.  The  
 
 
11  
 
 
Cf. G. acone, Aspetti e problemi della pedagogia contemporanea (Fornello: SEAM,  
2000), 37.  
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term "Humanities" now no longer referred to just the liberal arts, fine 
arts, literature, classical education, or literary studies, but to a culture 
of values founded on man and his inherent dignity. The traditional 
humanist model, anchored to the individualistic and minoritarian  
past, was abandoned.  Purified  by  its  own  evolution and  the  weight  
of circumstances, this educational model accepted the new social 
challenges, without renouncing its basic principles.  
What was defended was not a simple curricular question but a 
deep sense of the humanizing function of education. From this angle, 
the Humanities became the specification of an educational attitude, 
both relational and formative,  whose essence  as  stated  by  Guardini,  
is found in the ethos of the immutable.12 What characterized this 
contemporary pedagogical humanism was its return to the ethical and 
spiritual fundamentals of education. It could be added that these stable 
criteria were those which always allowed for dialogue within society, 
and produced answers to the most pressing problems regarding the 
human being and his destiny.  
 
 
 
An Argument for the Humanities as Vital to Education  
 
Having heard these voices from the past, specifically on the debate on 
the Humanities in Secondary Education, we present in this third 
section some lines of argument which show how vital the humanities 
are to education, to a certain extent through a historical perspective.  
We will examine the different ways or spheres in which the 
"vital-ness" of the Humanities may be felt or may make a difference from 
the  standpoint  of  education.  Specifically,  we  will  see  the  role  that  
history, culture, the arts, the liberal  arts,  the  Humanities  in  general  play  
in promoting the search for the common good, the social dimension  
of  education.  We will also underline their starring role in sensitive and  
 
 
12  
 
 
Cf. R. Guardini, Persona e libertà (Brescia: La Scuola, 1987), 119.  
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creative education, as in aesthetics and ethics. They thus assist in the 
development of a complete individual. in short, we could say that the 
main arguments in defense of the intrinsic value of the Humanities  
are in their communicative and relational capacities—first conveyed 
through language.  
 
Culture and history  
 
Historical continuity refers to the recognition that culture is inserted, for  
good or ill, into the collective strength of humanity over the centuries.  
In opposition to the slightly naïve pride of an evolutionist thesis is the 
assertion that great intellectual and moral values had been maintained 
through time. History is the depository for this wealth of knowledge and 
experience and constituted the legacy of the Western world. However, 
this legacy, which education made its business to transmit to the new 
generations, was not of the same caliber for all the disciplines.  
 Stated F. Guizot, author of the first organic law of popular 
education in France, "unlike science which is always being renewed 
and must move at the pace of its progress, true morals from which  
virtue is born are unchanging."  
 
En matière d´instruction et des sciences, il faut marcher toujours pour être  
au niveau de leurs progrès; mais, en fait de morale, il faut rester immobile et 
fixe au milieu des secousses que les révolutions du monde et de ses idées font 
subir aux principes qui la constituent. […] La Physique d´Aristote a perdu 
beaucoup de sa valeur, tandis que la conduite de Socrate saisit encore les 
âmes de la même admiration qu´elle inspirait à ses disciples13
 
 
13  
 
 
F. Guizot, Instruction Publique : Éducation. Extraits. (Paris: Librairie Classique,  
Eugéne Belin, 1889), 180. One must always be updated when it comes to teaching 
(education) and the sciences; but the matter of morals must remain immobile and 
fixed amidst the revolutions shaking the world, and its ideas must be subjected to its 
constituting principles . . . The Physics of Aristotle has lost much of its value, while 
the conduct of Socrates still captures the soul of admiration it inspired in his 
disciples. (Italics and translation by Ed.)  
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Education, he concluded, has to follow the enlightenment of the 
centuries and the eternal virtues. if nothing could affect immutable 
ethical principles, what is to be done is to return to the gifts of God, 
guarded and beautifully expressed by so many generations.  
Historical continuity, therefore, does not refer to scientific 
knowledge in constant evolution, but to what contains the keys to 
human wisdom, or which prepared for its assimilation into human 
wisdom. This cultural legacy, therefore, is not a deposit just to be 
safeguarded but a source of inspiration. As the Spanish philosopher 
García Morente wrote at the turn of the century, what barbarians did 
was to conserve conquered treasures to create clichés and cultivate the 
trite. On the other hand, the spirit of irony in the Socratic sense 
consisted of dissatisfaction and in constructive nonconformity.14 
Thus, the past is detached from immobilism, and becomes a 
dynamic force for understanding the present and planning the future. 
This brings about two moments for education, one of understanding, in 
which the person would participate in the civilizing trend, and 
another, of collaboration in the communal work towards culture. Like 
the face of Janus, remarked the German philosopher and theorist of 
education, Otto Willmann, education “looks simultaneously at the past, at 
the chain of generations which will grow with a new link, and at the 
assets made up of transmitted custom, which are like an inheritance 
one is obliged to preserve and pass on.”15  
Another essential feature of the aforementioned attitude which 
the Humanities supply is that of teaching a person how to contribute to 
the good of society. This had become inevitable and urgent by the end of 
the century. Bourgeois individualism on the one hand, and Marxist 
collectivism on the other threatened the social reorganization process 
embarked upon by the contemporary world.  What  was  needed  was  
the education  of  a  new  model  citizen—which  was  an  old  ambition  
 
 
 
14 
 
15  
 
 
 
M. García Morente, Escritos pedagógicos (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1975), 34.  
O. Willmann, Teoría de la formación humana (Madrid: C.S.I.C., 1948), 50.  
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that was resurrected by the state of affairs. What was beginning to be 
understood was that an atomized world required good leadership to 
replace the diminishing dominant class which has entered into the 
scene, as Chateaubriand had foretold. Indeed, good citizens were 
needed,  but  democratic  coexistence  also  required  guiding  forces.  
In his analysis,  the eminent  Belgian sociologist and  professor  at  the  
University of Brussels, Adolphe Prins, expounded this need:  
 
S´il n´y a ni fin de siècle, ni fin d´une classe, il semble bien qu´il y ait un 
de ces moments d´évolution rapide de la civilisation: le développement 
prodigieux de toutes les sciencies a agrandi, dans de proportions inconnues 
jusqu´ici, le champ de la pensée; la concentration prodigieuse des richesses a 
agrandi dans les mêmes proportions le champ des conflits sociaux. Les 
conceptions se transforment dans tous les domaines; l´aspect des choses 
varie dans toutes les directions. Pour suivre ce mouvement, pour s´y 
adapter, l´esprit public devrait être plus fortement armé que jamais par la 
haute culture, et c´est précisément maintenant que l´on constate un 
appauvrissement indéniable de cette haute culture qui est cependant aussi 
nécessaire à l´homme pour bien penser que l´air lui est nécessaire pour 
respirer.  
 
Quelle est la cause de la situation? Pourquoi notre culture n´est-elle pas  
plus générale? Et tout d´abord, quand on parle de haute culture, on songe 
immédiatement aux universités et l´on se demande quelle est leur part de  
responsabilité dans l´état des esprits.16 
 
 
16  
 
 
A. Prins, L´Organisation de la liberté social et le devoir social (Paris : F. Alcan, 1895,)
217. If there is no end of the century,  or  end  of  a  class,  it  seems  that  there  is  
a period of rapid evolution of civilization: the prodigious development of all 
Sciences  expanded,  in  proportions  hitherto  unknown,  the  field  of  thought;   
the prodigious concentration of wealth has expanded social conflicts. Concepts 
transform  all  domains;  things  differ  in  all  directions.  To  follow  this  
movement  and to adapt  to  it,  the  public  mind  should  be  more  heavily  armed,  
now more than ever,  by high culture,  and it is precisely now that we can see an 
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To the intellectual world and its principal institution, the university, 
were relegated this social responsibility. But as Adolphe Prins indicated, 
the University was not simply to be a factory producing doctors, 
lawyers or economists, although this is of course one of its functions. 
Its true mission, however, is to promote a highly intellectual and moral 
culture given that, like it or not, it would be the education for the 
majority of future statesmen and leaders. But alas little could be done. 
Public opinion, dominated by the culture of the masses, did not want it 
that way. The legislators gave in to this sentiment and pressured the 
universities toward more practical studies.17  
The same mentality was applied to secondary education, and 
the result was that the University could not find an adequate preparatory 
education within a system lacking in organic coherence. The question 
went right back to where it began that of giving importance to superior 
primary and secondary education. The democratization of culture, in 
turn, would give rise to equal opportunities for all citizens where their 
particular capabilities, and not their economic status, would involve 
greater participation in public life.  
On the other hand, one of the most reiterated criticisms of 
this educational model, that of intellectual elitism, also surfaced. This 
accusation was based in part on the social background of the students, 
and in part on the classical definition of the Humanities as liberal and 
disinterested knowledge. In the collective imagination, cultural 
education continued for the well-off bourgeoisie who were sure of the 
economic and professional future of their children. It was the "letter" that 
had been taken into account and not the "spirit" of these studies. 
According to the letter, the Humanities constituted knowledge that had  
 
 
undeniable impoverishment of high culture which is, however, necessary for man to 
think, the same way that air is necessary to breathe.  
What is the cause of the situation? Why is it that our culture is not general? And 
first of all, when we talk of high culture, we immediately think of universities and we 
ask what is their share of responsibility in the [formation of the] state of mind. 
(Italics and translation by Ed.) 
17    Cf. Ibid, 219.  
 
143  
 
 
  
SYNERGEIA 
 
 
 
no practical applicable end, and was therefore, useless. Or, according to 
the positivist vision of Herbert Spencer, merely an ornament of 
civilized life which could in no way stifle the march of progress.  
This argument was eventually refuted when the unity of 
wisdom artificially disintegrated. The sciences and the arts were not 
really groups of separate subjects and were actually far from conflicting. 
The error consisted in believing that the Humanities were a beautiful 
bundle that had no fundamental aim while the sciences were sought 
only for their material usefulness. In actuality, both should share the 
same disinterested search for truth, and both, in turn, should persevere in 
the love of wisdom; the noble and eternal spirit of philosophy. But, if 
this spirit had been lost from view, it was precisely the sciences that 
were so pressured by dominant utilitarianism. On detaching themselves 
from their educational and cultural meaning, they had without doubt 
begun a brilliant career, but one unfortunately threatened by their very 
essence.  
Henri Poincaré, a member of the Ligue por la culture française, 
made it very clear in his writing that there was a need to reorientate 
that utilitarian viewpoint toward an intellectual one, and rescue the 
objective; the education of wise men.  
 
Alors, cela est bien clair. Le savant ne doit pas s´attarder à réaliser des fins 
pratiques; il les obtiendra sans doute, mais il faut qu´il les obtienne par surcroit. Il 
ne doit jamais oublier que l´objet spécial qu´il étudie n´est qu´une partie d´un 
grand tout qui le déborde infiniment, et c´est l´amour et la curiosité de ce grand tout 
qui doit être l´unique ressort de son activité. La science a eu de merveilleuses 
applications, mais la science qui n´aurait en vue que les applications ne serait plus la 
science, elle ne serait plus que la cuisine. Il n´y a pas d´autre science que la science 
désintéressée.18  
 
 
18  
 
 
H. Poincaré, Les sciences et les humanités (Paris:A.Fayard, 1911), 31.  
So, this is clear. The scientist must not dwell on the achievement of practical  
ends; he will obtain them without a doubt, but he must get them only in addition. 
He must never forget that the special object that he is studying is only a part of an  
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The education either of a wise person or of a modest student from the 
popular or bourgeois class should not differ or depart from a spirit of 
love for knowledge and truth. Incompatibility between general and 
specific should not exist. As the Spanish pedagogue and disciple of 
Krause, Giner de los Rios, averred, this particular aim of education 
should continue developing, in harmony and solidarity. He thus 
distinguished between the two educational orders—the general and 
the specific—both of which are indispensable:  
 
If the latter corresponds to our interior vocation and it makes 
us useful organs in the division of social work, then the man 
without a profession although educated, intelligent, good, and 
honest, rich or poor, must be considered a parasite.  
 
In turn, general education, whether good or bad, is imposed on 
us, it interests us in all the remaining orders, aims, and works 
alien to our profession, it keeps the spirit open to the universal 
communion, and prevents it from being distanced and 
degenerating, closing itself in the routine of the profession in 
which it inevitably falls, whether this profession be priest, poet 
or philosopher. Both educational orders must help each other, 
one having to progress with the other and by means of the 
other, not in an inverse ratio, as sometimes it used to be 
thought.19 
 
Many contemporaries of de los Rios must have been startled. The 
secondary curriculum was thought  to  be  already  excessive.  Physicians  
 
 
 
infinitely greater whole, and it is love and curiosity for this great whole that fuels his 
activity. science has had wonderful applications, but science without a view of its 
applications would no longer be science, it is no more than cooking. it will only 
remain an uninteresting science. (italics and translation by ed.)  
19  F. Giner De Los Ríos, "Pedagogía universitaria," in Obras completas, t. X (Madrid:  
Imp. Clásica, 1916-1936), 14.  
 
145  
 
 
 
SYNERGEIA 
 
 
 
began warning the public about the health risks to which students 
were exposed because of their overloaded curricula, where the arts, the 
sciences, theory, practice, the modern languages, the numerous 
activities which modern education proposed, were combined. To 
further add specializations was an exercise in confusion. Giner de los 
Ríos understood, however, that even the best curriculum could not 
aspire to include all the spiritual richness of humanity, or all knowledge, 
or all the abilities of a professional. The important thing was to give an 
adequate orientation, which would open the minds of the students. 
This was a necessary point in a period overwhelmed by cultural and 
scientific growth and still new facets which had been introduced into 
the life of the scholar.  
In any case, what was proposed was not to impoverish 
education by making it accessible to all, but to raise everybody to a high 
educational level. True cultural values and properties were identified, 
universal and common legacy distinguished from partial expressions 
such as national culture, born from the "spirit of the people," or to 
differentiate it from the phenomenal growth of the education of the 
masses now based on the paradigm of the consumer and social 
leveling, and even the identification of culture with ideologies or 
religions. Neither the involvement of these two different spheres nor 
the richness which the cultural expressions contributed to the general 
panorama was denied. It was only warned that what united human 
beings was not the expression of the peculiar but the sharing of 
wisdom. To this end, Newman spoke of a "common-wealth" or 
"human society" driven by the same principles, the same esteem and 
respect for the classics: “and the subjects of thought and the studies to 
which they give rise or, to use the term most apt for our present 
purpose, the Arts, have generally been the instruments of education 
the Civilized orbis terrarum have adopted.”20  
 
 
 
20  
 
 
 
H. Newman, The Ideal of a Liberal Education. A Selection from the Works of Newman  
(London: Harrap, 1953), 51.  
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The studia humanitatis or bonae litterae, liberal arts, arts, classical 
studies, or Humanities reappeared under a new concept—general 
culture, in contrast, not to scientific realism, but to the excesses of 
professional specialization. The risk that this approach involved, 
however, consisted in the fact that general culture would be understood as 
a juxtaposition of equivalent knowledge: a little of everything and at 
the same level, in as full a curriculum as possible. This would have 
endangered not only the already weakened synthesis of knowledge, but 
also the specific value of each discipline. In other words, when the 
connection between the arts and the sciences is lessened, the chances 
of them losing their original significance become greater.  
There was no difficulty with regard to the sciences. A century of 
pedagogic reflection has clearly left their capacity for developing the 
spirit of analysis, for increasing observation, and forging a rigorous 
and solid reasoning. The Humanities, on the other hand, were 
traditionally considered the truly educative discipline, yet if the 
sciences were to be set on the same level, there would necessarily be a 
different understanding of its meaning.  
 
The relational value of the Humanities  
 
The principal arguments in defense of the intrinsic value of the 
Humanities were in their communicative and relational capacities—first 
conveyed through language. Through the process of minimalization 
which had appeared in modern Humanism, knowledge was divided 
into verba and res, words and things. This dualism, which was related to 
the process of simplification, considered the art of language as the 
nucleus of all studies within the Humanities, where, unfortunately, it 
became the first priority. While it was true that for centuries, language 
has been the basis of this educational model, it was so because it has 
been used in the best humanistic tradition, as the key to knowledge, its 
principal means of transmission, and the human resource par excellence  
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for communication. To think, to write, to speak or converse well and 
with style required language. It is for this reason that Greek, Latin and 
the classical arts, which Newman described as the language of 
civilization, survived through time.  
In the contemporary world, however, these languages, 
although considered immortal, began to be thought of as unnecessary.  
They became the  target  of  critics  and  a  symbol  of  the  futility  of  
the Humanities. Their study eventually became part of the same 
specialization that they wished to combat.  New  fields  of  the  study  
of languages were subjected to philological investigation, and in 
secondary  school,  modern  languages  substituted  for  the  classical.  
The ancient classics, while they remained a universal heritage, became 
accessible in translations, and substituted by the "new classics." 
Although these studies continued to be defended for their historical 
importance or, as Unamuno explained, for "the difficulty of renouncing 
work which had  taken  so  much  effort  to  acquire,"  it  was  understood  
that they were replaceable by others which fitted in more easily into 
modern culture. 
Contemporary humanism arose in order to save what was 
fundamental—the human capacity for transcendence, to open up to 
one another, to communicate through time and space by means of 
precise, expressive, and pleasing language. This is something that could 
not be provided by the physical sciences, nor was it acquired through 
observation and experimentation. It was, as it had always been, the 
prerogative of the arts, of grammar and literature, rhetoric and oratory. 
Yet beyond what is considered simply the disciplines, and what 
was emphasized in humanistic pedagogy, was the value behind the 
master-disciple relationship, the formative strength of dialogue, the 
connection between two souls by means of the word. It tried to 
rescue that which the educational experiences of rationalism and 
naturalism, in their obsession for geometrically linked lessons and 
indirect education, had lost.  
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Sentimental and creative education  
 
From then on, another important educational facet of the Humanities 
was deduced, that of feelings. Among the different approaches 
related to this question throughout the 19th century, the common 
denominator was once again the reaction against the dryness of the 
scientific model proposed by the enlightenment. One of the most 
complete and detailed treatises of the century, L´Education progressive ou 
étude du cours de la vie by the Swiss educator Necker de Saussure, is also 
one of the most reasoned defenses for the education of the feelings. 
She states that those who put reason first are wrong because the child 
loves before he understands or plays. But it is above all in his youth 
that a person needs ideals, ideals which are guided by noble and high 
sentiments. To awaken sympathy, admiration, or taste was to develop 
the creative capacity in all its aspects, but particularly the artistic and 
the literary. Education had to shape the poet as well as the logician.  
In a judgment admirable for her time, Necker de Saussure 
recognized the advantages, but also the limitations of an analytical 
spirit and a utilitarian education. What developed, she noted, was a 
society that was calculating and aged, and incapable of enthusiasm. 
Like so many intellectuals, she admired the advances of science and 
the benefits of realist education, but she recognized the educational 
capacity of the Humanities which were more in harmony with the 
deepest desires of the human heart, and with religious education. In 
her opinion, the principal feeling which inspired man to perfection in 
every order, including the cultural, was love for God.21  
 
Moral education  
 
If the aforementioned type of education did not fall into the weakness  
of sentimentalism or into an aesthetic vacuum, it refined the soul; it  
 
 
21  
 
 
Cf. A. Necker de Saussure, L´Education progressive ou étude du cours de la vie (Paris :  
Garnier Fréres-Paulin, 1847).  
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led it to good, and prepared it for moral truths. The sciences lacked 
this capacity. Their path to morality was slow and indirect, since they 
entrusted education to the method and to its capacity to strengthen 
reasoning. Its contents were neutral and exact, but they said nothing 
about the most intimate human problems.  
The Humanities, in this sense, were superior. In the middle of 
the 19th century, in a session in the House of Deputies, Lamartine 
stated the need for uniting the arts and the sciences. He was convinced 
that they were complementary, but not equivalent:  
 
Si le genre humain était condamné à perdre entièrement un de ces deux 
ordres de vérités, ou toutes les vérités mathématiques, ou toutes les vérités 
morales, je dis qu´il ne devrait pas hésiter à sacrifier les vérités 
mathématiques, car, si toutes les vérités mathématiques se perdaient, le 
monde industriel, le monde matériel subirait sans doute un grand 
hommage, un immense détriment; mais, si l´homme perdait une seule de ces 
vérités morales dont l´études littéraires sont le véhicule, ce serait l´homme 
lui-même, ce serait l´humanité entière qui périrait... Cette éducation 
exclusivement professionnelle, scientifique, industrielle, que je veux, comme 
vous, doit-elle commencer avec l´enfance ou ne doit-elle pas être précédée par  
une éducation morale, littéraire, par une éducation commune22 
 
 
22    A. Lamartine. Chambre des deputes, séance du 23 mars 1837, in O. Gréard Éducation et 
instruction. Enseignement secondaire, t. II (Paris: Hachette, 1889), 64. If mankind were 
sentenced to totally lose one of the two orders of truth—all mathematical truths, 
and all moral truths—I say that he should not hesitate to sacrifice mathematical 
truths, because if all mathematical truths were lost, the industrial world, the material 
world would severely suffer without doubt, a huge injury, but if man loses a single 
one of the moral truths taught to him by way of literary studies, it is man himself 
who will be lost, it will be the whole of mankind who would perish. . . This 
education that is exclusively professional, scientific, industrial that I want, just like 
you, should it start in childhood or should it be preceded by a moral and literary 
education, by a common education? (Italics and translation by Ed.)  
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The Humanities, therefore, contributed to moral education and, along 
with scientific education, prepared the way for the study of philosophy 
which was the culmination of the curriculum and the key to a complete 
construction of knowledge. As so insistently opposed to the confusion 
created by positivism, philosophy was the mother science, the trunk 
from which the branches of knowledge grew. This role had arisen from 
the philosophical attitude for excellence, the admiration of man, and 
the need to respond to radical questions about God, the world, and 
himself. It stood, therefore, above the rest; independent of them, and 
at the same time closely related. Without the help of philosophy, the 
natural sciences, centered on the particular and the contingent, would 
only become isolated, and finally routine. It could be said that in the 
19th century, the defense of the organic unity of wisdom, philosophical 
reflection, and the value of the interdisciplinary dialogue was already 
incipient.  
 
 
Final remarks  
 
The current crisis is no more than the continuation of an open process of 
modern thinking. The creation of an atomized society resulting from 
individualism was clear in the 19th century. One solution was 
commitment to an education that would stamp out the isolation and 
partiality of the scientific-technical paradigms. In short, what was 
defended in the 19th century was the cultural and educational value of 
the humanistic tradition. The opportunity was presented with the 
construction of secondary education. The arguments have not altered 
the standpoint, and the conclusion remains unchanged: an education 
which disregards the Humanities will renounce an essential part of 
itself. Most inevitably, it is time to reconsider the Humanities, and time 
for educators to resurrect its vital existence.  
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